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Kamp: The English Legacy of the Second Amendment - History and Myth

THE ENGLISH LEGACY OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT-HISTORY AND MYTH
Allen R. Kamp*

.

He said, "that he was the greatest Tyrant to the Neighbours in every
other Instance, and would not suffer a Farmerto keep a Gun. . .
I.

THE PROBLEM-HELLER AND ENGLISH HISTORY

According to the majority opinion of Justice Scalia in District of
Columbia v. Heller,2 pre-Second Amendment adoption English history
informs the Amendment's meaning. The majority opinion discusses the
historical background after analyzing the language of the Amendment:
Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they
guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical
background of the Second Amendment. We look to this because it has
always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the
First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The very
text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence
of the right and declares only that it "shall not be infringed."
A moment's reflection would tell us that the Bill of Rights did not
codify English practice. There was no right to the "free exercise of
religion" in England, there was an established religion, and freedom of
the press was limited to there being no prior restraint.' Heller itself

* Professor of Law Emeritus, John Marshall Law School; J.D., University of Chicago,
1969; M.A., University of California at Irvine, 1967; A.B., University of California at Berkeley,
1964.
1.

HENRY FIELDING, JOSEPH ANDREWS 98 (Martin C. Battestin ed. 1967) (1742).

2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
3. Id at 592 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. amend. I).
4. See Gordon Lloyd, Bill of Rights: The English and Colonial Roots of the U.S. Bill of
Rights, TEACHING AM. HIsT., http://teachingamericanhistory.org/bor/roots-chan (last visited Feb.
15, 2018).
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contradicts the pre-existing rights approach. Justice Scalia noted,
"William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not
attending service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties,
one of which was that they were not permitted to 'keep arms in their
houses."' 5 The majority opinion here recognizes that there was no free
exercise of religion in England. 6
Justice Scalia states that the purpose of the Amendment was to
assure a "citizen's militia":
[P]etitioners' interpretation does not even achieve the narrower
purpose that prompted codification of the right. If, as they believe, the
Second Amendment right is no more than the right to keep and use
weapons as a member of an organized militia, if, that is, the organized
militia is the sole institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment's
guarantee-it does not assure the existence of a "citizens' militia" as a
safeguard against tyranny. 7
But as we will see, there never was a universal militia in England.
Toward the end of his opinion, Justice Scalia turns to the
limitations on Second Amendment rights.' Once again, history
is dispositive.
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases,
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the
19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues. 9
He then relies on Blackstone:
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep
and carry arms. [United States v.] Miller said, as we have explained,
that the sorts of weapons protected were those "in common use at the
time." We think that limitation is fairly supported by the

5. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1769)).
6. See id.

7. Id. at 599-600 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 626-28.
9. Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
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historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of "dangerous and
unusual weapons."' 0

Thus, the Heller majority purports to be based on pre-Amendment
historical practice. We will see that its description of that practice is
more mythical than real.
II.

THE ENGLISH RIGHT TO KEEP ARMS-A PREVIEW
AND THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Whig Supremacy

Before plunging into the histories of England in the eighteenth
century, one should note that none of the histories of England examined
for this Article mention the issue of gun rights per se. Gun ownership
was an issue under the Game Laws and there were controversies over
how inclusive the militia should be, but gun rights in themselves were
simply not an issue. There was no National Rifle Association ("NRA"),
no chronic incidents of mass shootings (because even a trained
infantryman could shoot only three musket rounds per minute), no Brady
organization, nor any legislation permitting open carry. There was no
party split on gun issues because there was only the Whig Party. No one
with any power wanted to arm the populace as a defense against the
government, because those in power were happy with things as they
were and did not want to rock the boat. As a member of Parliament
perhaps expressed, "Reform, sir! Don't talk to one of reform-things are
bad enough as they are." (Probably apocryphal.)
The eighteenth century was known as the era of Whig Supremacy,
in which a ruling oligarchy, a society of connections, controlled
Parliament, the judiciary, local government, the established church,
hunting, and the militia." The Whigs purged the opposition, the Tories,
both at national and local office.' 2 For our study, it is important that the
Justices of the Peace (key to the enforcement of the Game Laws) and the
Militia officers were all Whigs."

10. Id. at 627 (citation omitted) (first quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179
&

(1939); and then quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 148-49).
11. To view the titles of two histories consulted by this Article, see GEOFFREY HOLMES
DANIEL SZECHI, THE AGE OF OLIGARCHY: PRE-INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN 1722-1783 (1993); and BASIL
wILLIAMS, THE WHio SUPREMACY 1714-1760 (2d ed. 1962) and see also ROY PORTER, ENGLISH
SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 48-56 (Revised ed. 1990).
12. HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 11, at 27, 46, 48.

13. See id. at 27.
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of Protestant and

Loyalty to the Protestant Succession, for example, was not just a
convenient passport to office for Whigs; it was total and
instinctive.... Every Whig stood firm on the fundamentals of the
Revolution constitution, as it had evolved between 1689 and 1716 - its
centrepiece a sovereign Parliament within the framework of a
mixed monarchy. 14

The principles of the Revolution were "erected into a political
system by Locke, the evangelist of whig doctrine."" Locke's emphasis
was on property rights: "The great end of Mens entering into Society
being the enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety."' 6 Thus,
Locke's "teaching encouraged a whig oligarchy to regard one of the
chief objects of government to be the protection of their own rights of
property and to adopt an attitude of neglect or indifference to social evils
affecting the lower classes of society.""
The ruling class was a small, but expanding circle, including "the
old aristocracy and county families, but also the novos homines . . . who
had acquired wealth and gained influence through commerce, adventure,
eminence in the professions, or speculation."" The ruling class was
extremely small and they all knew each other and almost all had no
money cares." Religion was not immune from this system. "The
established religion was indeed regarded by most politicians, and many
churchmen too, of the eighteenth century, first as a safeguard for the
whig system of government, and especially as a valuable form of police
control over the lower classes."2 0 Church offices were used to provide
for the offspring of the great Whig families.
Being part of the establishment required land. Wealth in personal
property did not count. One had to have a landed estate to be a voter, a
magistrate, or to hunt.2 ' "Peerage-ogling plutocrats had to play a waiting
game. First they had to buy rolling acres . . . establish a county family
and establish political pull, and finally assiduously cultivate friends in

14.

Id. at 48-49.

15.
16.

WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 3.
Id at 5 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

§

134 (J.W.

Gough ed., Basil Blackwell Oxford 1946)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 145-46.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 76.
21. PORTER, supra note 11, at 50.
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high places."2 2 During the eighteenth century, landed wealth became
more "concentrated in the hands of an upper crust of great proprietors,
whose numbers could be counted in hundreds rather than in
thousands."23 Locally, there was a government of the local oligarchies.24
For our purposes, this makes it hard to make generalizations that are true
for all of England. The enforcement of the Game Laws and the
organization of the militia varied widely from place to place.2 5
The Whig elite knew that they were at the top of the social order by
the will of God and that only they had the ability and duty to rule. 26 We
may see this in Blackstone's introduction to his Commentaries where he
describes the need for legal knowledge on the part of the elite in
fulfilling their high social role." He starts by characterizing that class as
"our gentlemen of independent estates and fortune, the most [useful] as
well as [considerable] body of men in the nation." 28 Such gentlemen
may be called upon to serve on a jury, more importantly they serve as
Justices of the Peace: "And here a very ample field is opened for a
gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining good order in his
neighbourhood; by [punishing] the [dissolute] and idle; by protecting the
peaceable and [industrious]; and, above all, by healing petty differences
and preventing vexatious [prosecutions]." 29
Those in Parliament have a greater responsibility:
They are the guardians of the Englifh conflitution; the makers,
repealers, and interpreters of the Englifh laws; delegated to watch, to
check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propofe, to adopt,
and to cherifh any folid and well-weighted improvement; bound by
every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to tranfmit that
conflitution and thofe laws to their pofterity, amended if poffible, at
leaft without any derogation. 30
The elite have both the ability and the duty:
Yet vaft as this truft is, it can no where be fo properly repofed as in the
noble hands where our excellent conflitution has placed it: and
therefore placed it, becaufe, from the independence of their fortune and

22.

Id. at 52.

23.

HOLMES & SZECHI, supra note 11, at 136.

24. See id. at 51.
25. See id. at 183-86.
26. Id. at 53 ("[W]hile many Whigs . . wanted to change the ministers, very few indeed
wanted fundamentally to change the system.").
27. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 7 (1765).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Id. at 9.
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the dignity of their ftation, they are prefumed to employ that leifure
which is the confequence of both, in attaining a more extenfive
knowlege of the laws than perfons of inferior rank: and becaufe the
founders of our polity relied upon that delicacy of fentiment, fo
peculiar to noble birth; which, as on the one hand it will prevent either
intereft or affection from interfering in queftions of right, fo on the
other it will bind a peer in honour, an obligation which the law efteems
equal to another's oath, to be mafter of thofe points upon which it is
his birthright to decide.3 1

The Whig attitude is best exemplified today in the television series
Downton Abbey, especially by Violet Crawley, the Dowager Countess of
Grantham, and Lady Mary Crawley. A sense of the era can be gained by
the modem reader by dialing back three hundred years, imagining the
Crawleys

of Downton Abbe-y in an era where

their estates

were

prosperous and there were no serious challenges to their status. In all,
Professor Porter writes: "For those safely above the poverty trap, the
Georgian age was an exhilarating time to be alive.""
B.

The English Right and its Limitations A Preview

The history of the English right to bear arms could be traced back at
least as far as the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated that "the
subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defense suitable
to their conditions, and as allowed by law."" To put this in perspective,
it's hard to conceive of a right of free speech that is only "allowed by
law." So there are two stories of the right, one expansive and the other
restrictive. In any case, Parliament was sovereign so it always had the
power to limit a right. "[W]e may venture to affirm, that the power of
parliament is [absolute] and without control."34
One major restriction on any right to bear and keep arms was the
Game Laws, which limited hunting to the landed elite. These laws are
described in a wonderful book, Gentlemen and Poachers:
The eighteenth-century English game laws have long been
synonymous with petty tyranny. By imposing a property qualification
on sportsmen, they effectively denied all but countrymen the right to
take game or even to possess a gun. Those who challenged the gentry's
monopoly were fined or imprisoned, usually after only a summary
31. Id. at 12.
32. PORTER, supra note 11, at 249.
33. Modern History Sourcebook:
The Bill of Rights,
1689,
FORDHAM
U.,
http:www.fordharn.edu/halsall/mod/1689billofrights.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). Note the

English Bill of Rights did not grant any rights to Catholics or Jews. See id
34.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 157.
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hearing by the local justice of the peace. In the early nineteenth
century, it was claimed that one out of every four inmates in England's
prisons was an offender against the game laws.35

The Prohibition on poaching and on the instruments of poaching
(for example, traps, dogs, and guns) is reminiscent of today's war on
drugs. Although many were imprisoned, poaching continued, complete
with shootouts between poachers and gamekeepers. Professor Munsche
lists seventeen pages of anti-poaching laws in an appendix. 6 It has been
estimated that only about one percent of the population had the land
wealth necessary to be allowed to own a gun.37 Note that the wealth had
to be in land-a rich merchant who rented did not qualify.
Gun rights did not exist in a large geographic area, the Scottish
Highlands. 39 The threats posed to the English throne from Scottish
Highlander attempts to restore the Stuart Dynasty resulted in prohibiting
Highlanders from bearing arms. 4 0 In the wake of the first Jacobite
Rebellion, the English realized that the Scottish clans and Highlanders
were a threat to the throne.4 1 In response to this realization, they imposed
the Disarming Act of 1716, also known as "The Act for the More
Effectually Securing the Peace of the Highlands in Scotland." 42 At the
Battle of Culloden, the final battle in the second Jacobite Rebellion,
Bonnie Prince Charlie and his Scottish Highlander troops attempted to
restore the Stuart Dynasty once more, but their sparse assortment of
weapons was not enough to defeat the English.4 3 The English went on to
prohibit the Highlanders even more stringently than before, banning
them from having any weapons, even the wee dirk worn on the
Scotsman's kilt. 44

35.

P.B. MUNSCHE.

GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS

1671-1831

(inner dust jacket) (1981).
36. Id. app. at 169-86.
37. See id. at 28.
38. Id. at 12.
39. MARGARET SANKEY, JACOBITE PRISONERS OF THE 1715 REBELLION: PREVENTING AND
PUNISHING INSURRECTION IN EARLY HANOVERIAN BRITAIN 115 (2005).

40. See id
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted) (explaining that the The Disarming Act prohibited
the carrying of personal weapons in certain places like roads and fields and ordered the "collection
and destruction" of arms in addition to fines and/or imprisonment).
43. PLANTAGENET SOMERSET FRY & FIONA SOMERSET FRY, THE HISTORY OF SCOTLAND
195-96 (1982). The casualty ratio was about seven to one in favor of the English. RICHENDA MIERS,
SCOTLAND 31-32 (2006).
44. MIERS, supra note 43, at 20. I met a kilt wearer in Scotland and remarked on the
embroidered representation of a dirk on his kilt. He explained it was meant to represent the banned
real dirk.
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Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion in Heller mentions
the Game Laws or the disarming of the Highlands.45 The majority does,
however, cite to Blackstone,4 6 who wrote that the English have had a
right to bear arms.47 But can we rely on Blackstone? He also said that in
a democracy there can be no sovereignty without suffrage, which he then
goes on to qualify by reasoning that the right to vote should be limited to
those who have enough wealth to enable them to make an independent
judgment.48 Both the right to vote and the right to anns were, in reality,
limited to a small percentage of the population. The limitation on the
right to vote was justified by the theory of "virtual representation," that
members of parliament would represent the entire realm, even if elected
by only a small part of the realm's subjects. I have been toying with the
idea that the right to bear arms was virtual; all had the right, but it was
exercised by the few who bore arms for all.
III.

A.

THE ENGLISH LEGACY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

The Indeterminism of the Determinism of HistoricalOriginalism

Both sides in Heller agreed that the Second Amendment had to be
understood in historical terns and that the determinative history
included the British as well as the American past. Professor Joyce Lee
Malcolm entitled her amicus brief for Heller as "The Right Inherited
from England." 4 9 Professor Malcolm starts her brief by citing Robertson
v. Baldwin" for her claim that the Bill of Rights was "simply to embody
certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our
English ancestors."-5 The Briefs "Summary Argument" opens as
follows: "Over a century ago, this Court declared it 'perfectly well
settled' that the Bill of Rights was 'not intended to lay down any novel
principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and
immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors.'" 2 On
45.
46.

See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 626.

47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 139.
48. "Next, with regard to the elections of knights, citizens, and [burgesses]; we may observe
that herein [consists] the [exercise] of the democratical part of our [constitution]: for in a democracy
there can be no [exercise] of [sovereignty] but by [suffrage], which is the declaration of the people's

will." I. at 164.
49.

Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in

Support of Respondent, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).
50. 165 U.S. 275 (1997).
51. Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, supra note 49, at 2 (quoting Robertson. 165 U.S. at 281).
52. Id. (quoting Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281). "The true [reason] of requiring any qualification,
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the other hand, another amici curiae brief, argues the opposite: "Though
Anglo-American political tradition did indeed value the idea of an armed
populace, it never treated private ownership of firearms as an
individual right.""
Both the majority and minority opinions in Heller are based on
historical originalism, although they have two views on what the history
says.54 The assumption that the Constitution's drafters only enacted
established rights in the Bill of Rights is patently false, as shown by the
First Amendment, which rejects the establishment and provides for the
free exercise of religion.
In England the Episcopal Church was
established, while Catholics, dissenting Protestants, and Jews were
subject to many disabilities." But the assumption that historical
originalism is the key to understanding the Second Amendment remains.
So both advocates for gun rights and advocates against them insist
that the "English Legacy" is crucial-but both also completely disagree
as to what that legacy was. It is strange that something that is seen to be
so determinative can be so indeterminate. As we shall see, I conclude
that the English law of gun rights and control revolved around English
issues of social class and politics that were totally different than the
issues that preoccupied Americans.57 English history cannot control
our Constitution.
B.

The American Dichotomy

1. Stand Your Ground Versus the Arts of Civilization
How should society be maintained-by the independent man
wielding righteous force or by the arts of civilization? Professor Stanley
Fish sets out these two worldviews in his essay Stand Your Ground, Be a
Man." He points out that "stand your ground" is more than a phrase-it

with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude [such persons] as are in [so] mean a [situation] that
they are [esteemed] to have no will of their own. If [these] persons had votes, they would be
tempted to [dispose] of them under [some] influence or other." I BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at
165.
53. Brief of Amici Curiae Jack N. Rakove et al., In Support of Petitioners at 2, Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (No. 07-290).
54.

Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (majority opinion),

with id at 647 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
56.
57.

See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 55.
See infra Part V.

58. Stanley Fish, Stand Your Ground, Be a Man, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2013, 9:00 PM),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2 01 3/07/22/stand-your-ground-be-a-man/? r-0.
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is an injunction. 59 This value is revealed in western movies, that a man
should stand his ground and face down the bad guys. There is, however,
a counter-theme, of valuing civilization and peace. Women in western
movies often represent these values, e.g., Grace Kelly in High Noon. 0
Even she, however, has to resort to violence in the end.6 1 A female
character in Shane advocates for gun control: "[W]e'd all be better off if
there wasn't a single gun in this valley." 62
We can see this anti-"stand your ground" stance in former President
Barack Obama's questioning of the stand your ground laws: he believed
the laws must be examined to determine if they are "designed in such a
way that they encourage . . altercations and confrontation . . . rather
than defuse potential altercations."63
2. Professor Reva B. Siegel's Interpretation of Heller as a Populist
Decision: The Emergence of Stand Your Ground
Professor Reva B. Siegel argues that the Hel/er majority decision is
an outgrowth from a social movement that arose in the aftermath of
Brown i. Board of Education.6 4 She points out that Justice Scalia's
majority opinion rejects the "hundreds of judges" who, he states, have
misread Miller, while he relies on the authority of the people." "These
[erroneous opinions] cannot nullify the reliance of millions of
Americans (as our historical analysis has shown) upon the true meaning
of the right to keep and bear anns.""6 The modem gun control movement
began in the 1960s." The assassination of John F. Kennedy and Martin
Luther King, Jr., along with urban riots and rising crime rates spurred
Congressional legislation regulating firearrns.' Even after Richard
Nixon's 1968 victory and the amount of racism that penneated the gun
debate, there was still support for gun control.6 ' There was, however, a

59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.

62. Id. ("Of course if there were no guns, there could be no shootings, no showdowns and no
opportunity to stand your ground. Manhood would have to be demonstrated in other ways, by tilling
the ground, raising a family, running a general store.").
63. Id. (quoting Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin (July 19, 2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvonmartin).
64. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122

HARV.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

L. REV. 191, 192-94 (2008).
Id. at 200-01 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 n.24 (2008)).
Id. at 200 (quoting He//er, 554 U.S. at 624 n.24).
Id. at 202.
See id. at 204.
Id. at 206-07.
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reaction against gun control in the 1970s, and support for handgun bans
dropping from sixty percent to forty-one percent by 1975.70 The NRA
began to oppose all types of gun control.' In 1977, certain members of
the NRA staged a coup, turning it into an organization that fought all
gun regulation. 7 2 The NRA's Institute for Legislative Action based its
attack on the common law and the Second Amendment.7 ' The individual
rights interpretation of the Amendment became a political argument. 74
The NRA's lobbying and direct mail politics transformed gun control
into a conservative social issue. 5 The social issue of anti-gun control
merged with the call to construe the constitution according to its original
intent. In 1989, Professor Sanford Levinson published The
EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, which changed Second Amendment
discourse. 7 ' He thus started the contemporary emphasis on the right of
insurrection, which according to supporters of gun rights was one of the
Amendment's purposes.n
Thus, the gun rights controversy morphed into a part of the culture
wars. In the mid-1990s, the Republican Party, under the leadership of
Newt Gingrich, joined in the fight, promising to work for the repeal of
the assault weapons ban." Gingrich distinguished between liberal and
conservative views on control: "Generally, liberals neither understand
nor believe in the constitutional right to bear arms. . . . For some
psychological reason, liberals are antigun but not anti-violent
criminal."' Professor Siegel characterizes the NRA and political right
view of the Second Amendment as one that "unmistakably" imagines
society as divided into "law-abiding citizens" and the "criminal," the
"deserving" and "undeserving," and resents governmental "identification
with the undeserving other.""'
In 1996, Wayne LaPierre recruited Charlton Heston to replace the
then-current NRA president." Heston traced the Amendment back to the
American Revolution, adding a component of racial inheritance: "And
no amount of oppressioi, no FBI, no IRS, no big government, no social

70.

Id at 207-12. The District of Columbia's absolute ban on handguns dates from this era.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Seeid at208.210.
Id. at 210.
Id. at211.
Id. at 207-08.
Id at 211.

76.

Sanford Levinson. The EmbarrassingSecontdAmenchnen, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).

77.
78.

Id. at 646-47.
Siegel, supra note 64, at 227-28.

79.

Id. at 228 (quoting NEWT GINGRIcIt. To RILNEw AMERICA 202-03 (1995)).

80.
81.

Id. at 235-36.
Id at 231.
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engineers, no matter what and no matter how, they cannot cleave the
genes we share with our Founding Fathers."82 Heston thus placed gun
rights firmly in the center of white, male, middle-class Evangelicals who
were being attacked in the culture wars."
American culture thus became polarized between those who saw
guns as being a central component of American manhood and those who
did not. This American gun culture has, as we will see, nothing
to do with the role of guns in England prior to the adoption of the
Second Amendment.

IV.

THE COMPONENTS OF THE ENGLISH LEGACY

The current American views on a right to bear arms are a recent
development in our history, part of the culture wars that inform our
contemporary political struggles. The Second Amendment's meaning,
however, is cast as deriving from English law. This Article discusses
four components of the English law on guns: the English Declaration
of Rights of 1687,84 the writings of Blackstone," the Game Laws," and
the Militia."
A.

The English Declarationof Rights

The English Declaration of Rights ("Declaration") was in effect a
negotiated agreement between Parliament and the King-to-be William
III of the Netherlands, on his taking of the throne of England after the
removal of James II." The Declaration represented the agreed upon
division of powers between the new King and Parliament.89 The final
version of the Declaration's arms provision read as follows: "That the
subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their Defense suitable
to their conditions and as allowed by Law.""o Professor Lois G.
Schwoerer points out that the Declaration was drafted in the context of
the English Protestant struggle against Catholicism and thus it was the

82.

Id. at 232-33 (quoting CHARLTON HESTON, THE COURAGE TO BE FREE 164, 168 (2000)).

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 233-36.
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infi-a Part
See infra Part

IV.A.
IV.B.
IV.C.
IV.D.

88. Patrick J. Charles, "Arms For Their Defence"?: An Historical. Legal, and Textual
Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be

IncorporatedinMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 351, 358 (2009).
89. Id., see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008) (stating the
Declaration "was codified as the English Bill of Rights").
90. Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c.2, § 7 (Eng.).
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Protestants who were to be armed in a collective defense against
Catholics.9 1 Those in favor and those against individual gun rights have
engaged in a furious debate over the meaning of the Declaration's
language. Does it give Protestants the individual right to bear arms, or
does it give Protestants only a collective right to have a militia?
Arguments and counter-arguments are made, based on a micro-analysis
of the language of the legislative history, and the historical background,
as well as later English cases (though there are not many). Heller
condenses this extensive, technical, and hyper-analytical debate to a
sentence: "It was clearly an individual right, having nothing whatever to
do with service in a militia." 92
I will set out the conflicting arguments, starting with Patrick
Charles's extensive law review article, Arms for Their Defence? 3
Charles argues that the Declaration's "arms" was in response to the fears
that Catholics in control of the militia could disarm all the Protestants on
a "massive scale."94 Charles argues that the disarming of many
"disaffected persons" from 1660 to 1701 shows there was no individual
right to bear arms.'" The final language of the Declaration allowed only
Protestants to have arms subject, however, to their socio-economic
status.' Arms for Their Defence?, contrary to Malcolm,' only referred
to "the philosophical right the 'have arms' provision echoed-the right
of the people to take up 'arms for their Defence' when all other means of
redress to a tyrannical government are exhausted."9 8 Joyce Lee Malcolm
reads the Declaration as creating the right to have arms.9" In doing so,
she writes not as an objective academic, but as a cheerleader for gun
rights: "The new magna carta, unlike the old, was to include a right for
Englishmen to possess arms."" 0 Her chapter dealing with the
Declaration is entitled "Arms for Their Defence: The Making of a 'True,
Ancient, and Indubitable Right.""'o From this title, one realizes that

91. Lois G. Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 27, 36-39 (2000).

92.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.

93. See generally Charles, supra note 88. Charles is not an academic, but is a book author. Id
at 351 n.*.

94.
95.

Id. at 360.
See id

96. Heller, 554 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
98. Charles, supra note 88, at 383.
99. Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, supranote 49, at 4, 9.
100. JOYCE LEE MALCOLM. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORtINS OF AN ANGLOAMERICAN RIGHT 114 (1994).

10 1.

Id. at 113.
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Malcolm starts with the assumption that the Declaration created an
individual right to bear arms.10 2 She characterizes the evolution of the
English right of citizens to be armed as "unusual," because of its
inception as a duty. 03

At the convention debating the Declaration, "[c]onvention members
expressed their outrage at the disarmament of law-abiding subjects
during the reigns of Charles and James."' 04 We now turn to Professors
Charles's and Malcolm's opposite interpretations of the debates and
proposals in the convention. We start with a speech by Thomas Erle
(perhaps never delivered) which proposed that "[blesides the militia
arms it will be convenient that every man that hath E10 and every
substantial householder in any town or city should be provided of a good
musket in case of an invasion."o5 Malcolm writes that Erle's
"suggestion, or something very like it" must have been on the
convention members' minds, for it mirrors "the first version of the arms
article, which declared that Protestants 'should provide and keep arms
for their common defence.""'" Charles reads Erle's language differently,
viewing the change to "may have arms" as "articulating that having arms
was an allowance by law-not a right per se."o7 Despite the continued
reference to arms "for 'their common Defence,"' to Malcolm, the
substitution of "may" for "should" signaled a shift away from the
"public duty" to be armed and asserted more emphasis on the right to
arms as an "individual right."'.
Charles sees the purpose of Erle's proposal to be enabling every
Protestant's duty to "protect against invasion."'0 9 Moreover, Charles
reads Erle's limitation of the extension of the right to "substantial
householders" as having the best interest of the nation in mind by
allowing arms for those "that have estates of their own," providing arms
only to those who meet certain hierarchical and socio-economical
qualifications.''o He notes "Erle's proposal ...
102.
103.

did not pass."'''

See id. at 113, 119-20.
Id. at I.

104. Id. at I15.
105. Charles, supra note 88, at 384 (quoting Mark Goldie, Thomas Erle's Instructions for the
Revolution Porlimtnent, December 1688, in 14 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 337, 345 (Clyve Jones
ed., 1995)). Malcolm gives a slightly different version. See MALCOLM, supra note 100, at I16-17.
106. MALCOLM, supra note 100. at 117.
107. Charles, supra note 88, at 385. It is most obvious here, as in Charles's and Malcom's
readings of Erle's speech, exactly how diametrically opposed their readings of the intentions behind
the Declaration really are.
108. MALCOLM, suprsa note 100, at I 18.
109. Charles,supra note 88, at 385.

110.

Id

I 1 1.

Id
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Now we come to the dropping of "common" from "common
defence" and the addition of "suitable to their Conditions and as allowed
by Law."" 2 The revised arms article now read: "That the Subjects which
are Protestants may have Arms for their Defense suitable to their
Conditions and as allowed by Law."" 3 Note that this language restricts
the right to Protestants (not Catholics) and makes the right subject to
Parliament, not the King.
Professor Malcolm concludes: "[T]he rephrasing shifted the
emphasis away from the public duty to be armed and toward the keeping
of arms solely as an individual right."l 4 Professor Malcolm assumes,
without discussion, that this provision granted an individual right to
arms."' In support of this assertion, she cites to the Commons Journal:
"The Commons Journal records without explanation a new version of
the article on the right of individuals to have arms.""' She concludes that
the convention "finally came down squarely, and exclusively, in favour
of an individual right to have arms for self-defence.""' Further, she
notes that "militia" was completely left out of the Declaration as well as
any reference to "common, as opposed to individual, defence.""'
Professor Malcolm sees the addition of "as allowed by Law" as a
compromise, the product of practical politics.'' 9
She does note that with the Game Act and the Militia Act still in
force, this right to bear arms "seems empty rhetoric." 20 She then retreats
from this obvious conclusion, which would totally obliterate her
thesis, stating that the final draft of the Declaration was a compromise:
"[T]he arms article declared a right that current law negated,
with the understanding that future legislation would eliminate
the discrepancy.""2
Charles, on the other hand, places more emphasis on the change to
"may" have arms being conditioned on the addition of "suitable to their
condition as allowed by Law." 22 He sees the addition as providing "an
allowance by law-not a right per se," finding that "may have
arms ... suitable to their conditions," does not articulate an individual

112.

MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 119.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id at 118.
See id.
Id. at 119 (citing 10 H.C. JOUR. 21-22 (1688-1693)).
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 120-121.
Id at 120.
Id.
Charles, supra note 88, at 378 (citing 1 W & M 2, c.2 (1688) (Eng.)).
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right to arms, but a right for the militia to defend against a tyrannical
government.12 The frequent use of "condition" in weapon, game, and
militia laws expresses the hierarchical and socio-economic status-the
"chain of being," on which the "right" was based.1 2 4 Citing to books,
pamphlets, and the literature of the time, Charles finds the meanings of
"arms for their common defence" and "arms for their defence" were the
same, both referring to the rights of the militia.' 25
Professor Schworer gives another explanation, that the right granted
by the Declaration was medieval in that it "was exclusive-not held by
everyone. Such a right was dependent upon property, status, or gift."1 2 6
In Heller, Justice Scalia concludes without discussion that the
Declaration gave individuals a right.1 27 "It was clearly an individual
right, having nothing whatever to do with service in a militia."l 28
B.

Blackstone

Both Joyce Lee Malcolm and the Heller majority rely on Sir
William Blackstone as authority-treating his Commentaries as the
definitive treatise on the Declaration.1 29 Blackstone wrote:
The fifth and laft auxiliary right of the fubject, that I fhall at prefent
mention, is that of having arms for their defense, fuitable to their
condition and degree, and fuch as are allowed by law. Which is alfo
declared by the fame ftatute and is indeed a public allowance, under
due reftrictions, of the natural right of refiftance and felf-prefervation,
when the fanctions of fociety and laws are found infufficient to reftrain
the violence of oppreffion.1 30
Blackstone's language, however, displays the same ambiguity as
does the English Bill of Rights and the Second Amendment. Is the right

123. Id. at 385. 387.
124. Id. at 378.
125. Id. at 387-88.
126. Schowerer, supranote 91, at 43.
127. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008).
128. Id. As we have seen, resolving this issue is not that simple.
129. See id. at 593-94; Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 49, at 4-5. Blackstone's Commentaries were the
first synopsis of English law since Lord Coke's, and were influential, both in England and the
United States. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593-94. It should be noted at the outset that Blackstone did
institute three innovations in legal education; innovations that have been sadly neglected. He created
the first wine cellar in an Oxford College. WILFRID PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE: LAW AND

LETTERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 94 (2008). He installed an in-house bar so that law students
did not have to leave the building to get a drink. Id. at 94-95. Also, when he wrote his scholarly
works, he always had a bottle of port on hand. Id at 210.
130. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 139 (citation omitted).
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individual or collective? Professor Malcolm argues that it is
individual."3 ' Others argue the opposite.1 32 In any case, natural rights
under Blackstone are subject to limitation: they "may be [restrained] by
[positive] laws enacted for [reasons] of [state], or for the [supposed]
benefit of the community."' 3 We see this in the areas of the right to bear
arms, the right to hunt game, the right to a jury, the right of
representation, and the right to sit in Parliament.
The Heller opinion does not mention it, but Blackstone's discussion
of the Game Laws notes how these laws limit the populace's right to
arms.1 34 Blackstone, as we will see, typically starts by affirming a right
and then goes on to state that that right is limited in society.13 5 in any
case, as noted by the Commentaries, Parliament is sovereign, which
prevents any judicial enforcement of any right against parliamentary
law.' Blackstone describes the Game Laws in his discussion of the
criminal laws of England:
Lastly, there is another offence, fo conftituted by a variety of acts of
parliament, which are fo numerous and fo confufed, and the crime
itfelf of fo queftionable a nature, that I fhall not detain the reader with
many obfervations thereupon. And yet it is an offence which the
fportfmen of England feem to think of the higheft importance; and a
matter, perhaps the only one, of general and national concern:
affociations having been formed all over the kingdom to prevent it's
deftructive progrefs. I mean the offence of deftroying fuch beafts and
fowls, as are ranked under the denomination of game .... But the
laws, called the game laws, have alfo inflicted additional punifhments
(chiefly pecuniary) on perfons guilty of this general offence, unlefs
they be people of fuch rank or fortune as is therein particularly
fpecified. All perfons therefore, of what property or diftinction foever,
that kill game out of their own territories, or even upon their own
eftates, without the king's license expreffed by the grant of a franchife,
are guilty of the firft original offence, of encroaching on the royal
prerogative. And thofe indigent perfons who do fo, without having
fuch rank or fortune as is generally called a qualification, are guilty not
only of the original offence, but of the aggravations alfo, created by the
ftatutes for preferving the game: which aggravations are fo feverely
punished, and thofe punishments fo implacably inflicted, that the
offence againft the king is feldom thought of, provided the miferable
131.
Support
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Brief of the Cato Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae in
of Respondent. supra note 49, at 4.
See, e.g., Charles, supra note 88, at 387.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TilE LAWS OF ENGLAND 411 (1765).

Id. at 413.
See id. at 411.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 143.
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delinquent can make his peace with the lord of the manor. This
offence, thus aggravated, I have ranked under the prefent head, becaufe
the only rational footing upon which we can confider it as a crime, is
that in low and indigent perfons it promotes idlenefs, and takes them
away from their proper employments and callings; which is an offense
againft the public police and economy of the commonwealth.1 37

These laws exist despite the fact that everyone has the natural right
to hunt game:
In the firft place then we have already fhewn, and indeed it cannot be
denied, that by the law of nature every man, from the prince to the
peafant, has an equal right of purfuing, and taking to his own ufe, all
fuch creatures as are ferae naturae, and therefore the property of
nobody, but liable to be feifed by the firft occupant.

But in society, the right to take wild animals is limited:
But it follows from the very end and conflitution of fociety, that this
natural right, as well as many others belonging to man as an individual,
may be reftrained by pofitive laws enacted for reafons of ftate, or for
the fuppofed benefit of the community. . . . [I]n confequence of this
authority, we find that the municipal laws of many nations have
exerted fuch power of reftraint; have in general forbidden the entering
on another man's grounds, for any caufe, without the owner's leave,
have extended their protection to fuch particular animals as are ufually
the objects of purfuit; and have invefted the prerogative of hunting and
taking fuch animals in the fovereign of the ftate only, and fuch as he
fhall authorize.1 39

And, in a passage that directly contradicts any right to bear arms,
Blackstone writes:
Many reafons have concurred for making thefe conftitutions: as, 1. For
the encouragement of agriculture and improvement of lands, by giving
every man an exclufive dominion over his own foil. 2. For prefervation
of the feveral fpecies of thefe animals, which would foon be extirpated
by a general liberty. 3. For prevention of idlenefs and diffipation in
hufbandment, artificers, and others of lower rank; which would be the
unavoidable confequence of univerfal licenfe. 4. For preventing of
popular infurrections and refiftance to the government, by difarming
the bulk of the people: which laft is a reafon oftener meant, than
avowed, by the makers of foreft or game laws.1 40

137.
138.

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 174-75.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 133, at 411.

139.

Id

140.

Id. at 411-12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This passed hidden in plain sight in
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So all Englishmen have a right to keep arns, except when
restricted. Professor Duncan Kennedy writes that Blackstone posits
natural rights and then blames the Normans and Parliament for limiting
these rights.14 1 Certainly this is how Blackstone deals with the natural
right to hunt game as the Norman kings reserved hunting for themselves
and then Parliament restricted hunting to the wealthier landed gentry.' 4 2
Kennedy also points out that, to Blackstone, holders of absolute rights
become holders of only relative rights as members of society.' 43 This
contract between abstract rights and reality shows up again in the right
of representation and the right to a jury.
Blackstone's own involvement in voting disputes shows the
disconnect between his rhetoric and reality. The issue was whether
copyholders by inheritance, rather than holding at the will of the lord of
the manor, could vote.' 44 To Blackstone, voting could be and was
restricted to those with a certain property qualification.' 4 5 This was
justified because only those with sufficient wealth could be trusted to
vote for the good of the country, rather than out of narrow
self-interest.
A bill to settle this question was introduced in Parliament and
Blackstone prepared what today would be called a position statement
against such copyhold voting.' 4 7 Blackstone used a historical approach
that would have done Justice Scalia proud. He summarized fifteenth
century statutes and described the four main types of feudal terms and
concluded that the copyholders by inheritance were not "freeholds" or
"free lands." 48 The issue was a complicated one, one which a traditional
freehold might refer to lands or to the type of terns by which the lands
were held. A tenant for life had a freehold interest, but only those
holding lands "in free socage" enjoyed freehold tenure." ' Blackstone
stated that customary freeholds were of such a nature.so
Blackstone's analysis in his legal brief opens with an affinnation
that "'in every free state' each member of 'the community . . .' has a

Book II of the Commentaries, and was missed by the Heller majority.
141. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205,

236-37 (1979).
142.

2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 133, at 415.

143,

Kennedy, supra note 141, at 273-74.

144.

PREST, supra note 129, at 126.

145.

See id.

146.
147.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 7.
PREST, supra note 129, at 127.

148.
149.
150.

Id
Id. at 128.
Id.
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voice in choosing 'those delegates, to whose charge is committed the
disposal of his property, his liberty, and his life."' 15 But of course, the
poor, having "no will of their own" cannot vote.1 52 Even if the rights of
members of a free state would argue for enlarging the franchise, the
existing laws must be followed.' 5 3
If you have been following so far, there is a right to vote, except for
the justifiable exception for those with not enough property. But
Blackstone in real life took part in a scheme to allow the propertyless to
vote.1 54 His motivation was not to enlarge the franchise, but to help his
candidate, the Earl of Abingdon.' 5 5 The local franchise was confined to
tenants of sixty-one town properties, called "burgage tenements."
Blackstone came up with and implemented a plan to acquire seven
burgage tenements and thirty-eight leases; "trusty Friends" of
Abingdon's would be granted leases before the election, enabling them
to vote, and then the leaseholds would be returned afterwards.5 7 Thus,
Blackstone laid down the rule (everyone has a right to vote), along with
its exception (actually only those with property qualifications), and then
subverted the rule(s) of his Commentaries with a successful scheme to
subvert the exception.' Wilfred Prest notes that he never showed any
unease in his position and his taking benefits for the corruption of the
election.'15 In other words, regardless of what Blackstone wrote, as
a practicing lawyer, he came up with a scheme to get around it and
elect his patron.
Blackstone's own election to Parliament was both convoluted and
corrupt. Lord Fitzmaurice, acting as Blackstone's aristocratic patron,
arranged to have Lord Bute, (who had the disposal of the borough of
Hindon "a thoroughly corrupt 'potwalloper' constituency") agree to
come up with the money to pay off the Hindon electors.' There was a
problem, however-Blackstone did not meet the qualification to be a
borough member of Parliament because his property was personal, not
real."' He solved the problem by buying an annuity on landed security

151.
152.

Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CONSIDERATIONS ON COPYHOLDERS (1755)).
Id. (quoting BLACKSTONE, CONSIDERATIONS ON COPYHOLDERS, supra note 151).

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. 128-29.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 224.
Id

157.

Id. These votes and leases were called "faggot-votes" and papers. Id.

158.
159.

See id. at 224-25.
Id.

160.

Id. at 180 (quoting L.B. NAMIER & J. BROOKE, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1754-90, at 415

(1964)).
161.

Id at 180.
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and settling an equivalent annuity out of his personal estate.162 The two
proprietors of Hindon borough were paid E2000.163 Today, this would be
illegal, but it must be remembered that Blackstone's society was
hierarchical and everyone had to have a sponsor. Like today's Chicago
Machine, the eighteenth century establishment "don't want nobody that
nobody sent."1 64

One more obstacle remained-the King intended to make him a
silk, in which "an MP who took silk must resign and stand
again." 16 That problem was solved by granting him a royal patent of
precedence rather than making him a silk.166 Blackstone maintained his
independence-his parliamentary seat was "conferred unsought, and
accepted unconditionally," 67 but he did prepare a bill about enclosures
on property belonging to his patron, the Earl of Suffolk.1 68 These actual
machinations and bribery were a long way from what was described in
the Commentaries; but Blackstone was not a neutral academic, he
used politics and preferment to become a judge and a member
of Parliament.' 69
Another instance of Blackstone's actions contradicting his writing
was his support for the House of Commons's refusal to seat John
Wilkes.' 70 Wilkes had been elected three times, but the House wanted to
ban him."' Blackstone argued "that Wilkes was guilty of 'an impious
libel, with intent to blaspheme the Almighty God."'"1 2 Prest writes, "But
the notion that by its mere resolution the House could effectively deprive
free-born Englishmen of the right to choose their parliamentary

162. Id. at 181.
163. Id.
164. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Remembering Abner Ji Mikva, One of America's Most
Dedicated and Inspiring Public Servants, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2016, 2:51 PM),
10906342.html.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/remembering-abner-j-mikva-b
For someone like me who has lived in Chicago for most of his life, the Whig oligarchy seems all too
familiar, although the members of the Cook County Democratic Organization (a.k.a. the Chicago
Machine) are not the landed gentry and the Mayor of Chicago has much more power than the King
of the United Kingdom did. The rules of "[d]on't make no waves," "[d]on't back no losers" and
"you need a sponsor" apply to both. See MILTON L. RAKOVE, DON'T MAKE No WAVES DON'T
BACKNO LOSERS 11, 108 (1975).
165. PREST, supra note 129, at 181.

166. Id.
167.

Id. at 182 (quoting THE LETTERS OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 1744-1780 (W.R. Prest

ed. 2006)).
168.

Id. at 227.

169. Id. at 182, 255.
170. Id at 237.
171. Id. at 239.
172. Id at 237 (quoting J. WRIGHT, SIR HENRY CAVENDISH'S DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, 129 (1841)).
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representatives was undeniably disturbing."1 7' A contemporary pointed
out that Blackstone's Commentaries made no mention of expulsion. 174
Thus, Blackstone operated on two levels, in his Commentaries
he wrote of natural rights and their limitations, and in real life he
ignored his writings.
In an essay, Blackstone on Judging, Professor John H. Langbein
argues that Blackstone knew his conclusions as to limitations on judicial
power were false:
Blackstone's sensitivity to the adaptability of the common law protects
Blackstone from "[t]he claim that Blackstone regarded the law as fixed
for all time." If so, however, it convicts Blackstone of the
inconsistency, indeed, the plain dishonesty, of resting his defence of
judicial power on the supposed binding force of legal rules whose
plasticity he knew well.1

15

Langbein further states,
There was, however, a much deeper flaw in Blackstone's account of
the allocation of power between judge and jury. As so often in the
Commentaries, Blackstone's account was formalistic, in the sense of
describing the nominal power relationships, while failing to
acknowledge what he and other lawyers of his day knew to be the
actual division of power and influence. 176
Langbien concludes: "[D]espite all the strengths of Blackstone's
Commentaries, the work is simply too unreliable to merit the deference
it tends to be accorded.""' Professor Michael Hoeflich explores the
reception of Blackstone into American law in his American
Blackstones. 1' He explains that there were many versions, not just one,
of the Commentaries in America. 179 These were of two types, the first
being the reissue of the English editions without change (and without
royalty payments).'
The second was the publication of the

173.
174.

Id. at 240.
Id. at 240-41.

175. John H. Langbein, Blackstone on Judging, in BLACKSTONE AND His COMMENTARIES:
BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 65, 68 (William Prest ed., 2009) (alteration in original) (footnote

(quoting Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 PENN. L. REv. 1, 43 (1996)).
Id. at 70.
Id at 77.
Michael Hoeflich, American Blackstones, in BLACKSTONE AND His COMMENTARIES:
BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY, supra note 175, at 171-84.
179. Id. at 171.
180. I. at 172, 177.
omitted)
176.
177.
178.
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Commentaries with notes specifically applicable to general American
law and a particular state's law.1 "' American lawyers realized that
Blackstone could only serve as an introduction to law and was not, by
any means, automatically applicable to American practice. 18 2 Publication
of the original Commentaries continued for several reasons: they
functioned as an introductory text, were a source of quotable phrases,
and looked impressive on the law office shelves. Also, since then the
American copyright law did not protect foreign authors, no royalties
need be paid.
It could be argued that whatever the English reality, the drafters of
our Bill of Rights accepted the Commentaries at face value. But the
drafters of the Bill of Rights had to know of the real conditions in
England. There was correspondence and travel between the United
Kingdom and America. They knew that Blackstone could not be applied
automatically in the United States.
Saint George Tucker, the only man who signed both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, edited the first
Blackstone that was adapted "to the Constitution and laws of the federal
government of the United States and of the Commonwealth of
Virginia."' Tucker explained that "the revolution which separated the
present United States of America from Great Britain . . . produced a
corresponding revolution not only in the principles of our government,
but in the laws."l 8 4 He continued, "Many parts of the laws of England
are also either obsolete, or have been deemed inapplicable to our local
circumstances and policy."'
The bare quotations of Blackstone in the NRA brief by Malcolm
and the Heller opinion both totally miss the fact that interpreting
Blackstone's exposition of the English law is complicated and his theory
and practice were not identical. The Heller majority opinion evidences
a complete misunderstanding of Blackstone's Commentaries and
his society.

181.
182.
183.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 172.

184. Id. at 173 (quoting ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION ANt) LAWS. OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, at iv-v (1803)).

185.

Id at 174 (quoting TUCKER.supra note 184, at xi).
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The Game Laws

1. The Social Context
Professor Munsche in his history of the English Game Laws,
Gentlemen and Poachers, explains that there were a multitude of laws
that governed "the pursuit of animals for sport in this period," and
regulated the use of guns in that pursuit.1 16 He lists one and a half pages
of "Principal statutes, 1275-1831" in small print, and a fourteen page
"guide to the laws" relating to deer, rabbits and game for 1660-1831,
broken down by offenses committed by any persons and those
committed by an unqualified person, the law applicable to gamekeepers,
and the applicable enforcement procedure. 7
The purpose of all these laws was to grant the landed upper class a
monopoly on hunting.' 8 They made hunting and the possession of the
means to hunt into crimes.' As such, they conflicted with any right to
keep and bear arms that might have existed. Professor Munsche points
out that the militia was to protect against arbitrary government by
making a standing army unnecessary and thus preventing the king from
governing without Parliament.'" The militia did not supplant the regular
army, "but the conviction persisted in many quarters that English liberty
was dependent on the existence of an armed and vigilant yeomanry. This
obviously ran counter to the spirit of the Game Act.""'
Gentlemen and Poachers studies those who "defended and
enforced" the Game Laws and those who broke them.'9 2 From the work
we are able to gain a deeper insight into the state of the world in of
eighteenth century England-clearly showing how different that world is
from ours and what made it so different from our own. Professor
Munsche points out that the Game Laws were not just hunting
regulations, but had an all-important social dimension, in creating an
identity for the gentry.'
The Game Laws were the creation of the
gentry-"[t]hey wrote the game laws, benefited from them, defended
them, enforced them - and they led the fight for their repeal."' 94
Remember that the English Bill of Rights limited gun rights according to

186.

MLNSCHE supra note 35, at 3.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 170-86.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id at 79-80.
Id. at 7.
See id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
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social condition and legislation and that those permitted to hunt were
also the minority permitted to vote, be members of Parliament,
and be officers in the militia. For the ruling class it was simply the
natural order.
The gentry and the majority of the English population, however,
had completely different view of the Game Laws' legitimacy: "Indeed,
the vast majority of the population had never really accepted the gentry's
right to a monopoly on game; they continued to believe that hares,
partridges and pheasants 'were ordained from the beginning free for
anyone who could overtake them.""9 5 The country gentlemen, however,
believed that society was benefitted because the poor were prevented
from developing habits of idleness, while at the same time rewarding
"men who gave freely of their time and fortunes in the service of their
community. In other words, the Game Laws were measures designed
to preserve a stable society, one which was rural-based, hierarchical
and paternalist.""'
With both sides-the gentry and the rural common folk-believing
that they had a God-given right to either have the game for themselves
or to hunt freely, the problem of poaching was endemic and intractable.
In many ways, the "war on poaching" resembled our own "war on
drugs." It was an unwinnable and ever-escalating conflict, a problem
with no solution.
We may have the idea that poachers captured game to feed their
families, but many sold their catch. It was the selling that distinguished
the poacher from the sportsman. Selling game violated "one of the
cardinal rules of sportsmanship in the eighteenth century."l97 Not only
was selling game not sporting, it was also a "threat to social order."' 98
To most country gentlemen, it seemed that the necessity of working for a
living was the only thing that kept the poor from idleness. "Without the
discipline of constant labour . .. the lower classes would . . . sink into

lives of crime and debauchery" leading inevitably to society's decay.' 99
Poaching was more than an activity of poor rustics trying to feed
their families, it had the characteristics of modem day organized crime.
Armed gangs made regular raids and once caught and sold, the game
was transported from the country to cities using a distribution system
that took the hares and pheasants from the country estates to the urban
195. Id. at 107 (quoting ROBERT FULFORD, SAMUEL WHITBREAD, 1764-1815: A STUDY IN
OPPOSITION 224-25 (1967) (statement of a fanner)).
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. at 53.
198. Id
199. Id. at 53-54.
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centers. In the last half of the eighteenth century, road improvements and
the creation of stage and mail coaches brought most towns within a day
of London. 2 0 The coachmen operated outside of regulation and bought
game to market without much risk to themselves. 20 ' So underneath the
multiple cloaks of the coachman, a popular image from Regency
romance novels, there often were rabbits and pheasants.202 The financial
incentive for the distribution system was a significant markup-"[i]n the
1820s ... poulterers sold game for two or two-and-a-half times the
amount paid to the poacher." 203
The trade became so vital to poulterers that they joined together to
pay for the defense of their members who were charged with the sale of
game. 204 The actions of the middlemen were made illegal in 1707, when
"any higgler, chapman, carrier, innkeeper, victualler or alehousekeeper"
was forbidden "to buy, sell or possess game under pain of a £5 fine (per
head of game) or three months in prison." 205 This Act, however, like
many of our drug laws, was ineffective.
The illegal, but profitable trade attracted informants and
blackmailers. These groups, of course, supported the Game Laws. Those
in the trade, like the drug dealers today or the bootleggers during
prohibition, enjoyed the higher profits that the Game Acts made
possible.206 Many poachers worked as individuals or in families, but in
the later part of the eighteenth century, there was a rise in poaching
gangs who were armed and sometimes killed informants. 207 There were
even pitched gunfights between poachers and gamekeepers. 2 s Like our
drug laws, the Act of 1755 banning the game trade gave poachers a
monopoly on the supply end.209 Poaching went "from a craft, it was
turning into a business - one which occupied large numbers of men and
was capable of yielding large rewards." 2 10 Professor Munsche concludes
by stressing the Game Laws' social importance:

200. Id at 60.
201. Id. at 60-61.
202. See id at 61; Jeffrey Nigro, Mystery Meets Muslin: Regency Gothic Dress in Art,
(2010), http://www.jasna.org/
Fashion, and the Theater, PERSUASIONS ON-LINE 10-11
persuasions/on-line/vol3lnol/nigro.htinl (discussing the significance of coachmens' cloaks in
Regency literature).
203. MUNSCIE, supra note 35. at 61.

204. Id. at 56-58.
205. Id. at 55 (quoting 5 Anne, c. 14 (1707) (Eng.)).
206. Id. at 62.
207.

See id. at 65-66, 68, 71.

208. Id. at 68-72.
209. Id. at 66.
210. Id.
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The game laws were born out of a desire to enhance the status of
country gentlemen in in the bitter aftermath of the Civil War. Their
message was that land was superior to money, a blunt assertion
of privilege which for a long time accepted, or at least was not
openly contradicted.2 1

For the ruling class it was simply the natural order.
2. The Enforcement of the Game Laws
a. Fines and Imprisonment

Legal process was divided between those conducted in informal
sessions before Justices of the Peace and the trials before the QuarterSessions.2 12 Both were presided over, of course, by the landowning
gentry (the same people who could vote, command the militia, and serve
in Parliament), who wanted to preserve their monopoly on game. 213 Both
proceedings were limited in the power to punish; the poacher could be
fined and if the fine were not paid, he could be whipped and confined to
jail for up to a few months. 214 The judges in the Quarter-Sessions were
also drawn from the gentry, but the indictment and findings of guilty and
innocence were in the hands of a grand and petty jury.215 Another
alternative was for plaintiffs (often game associations) to bring a civil
suit against poachers.21

The expense of these suits could be ruinous for

the plaintiff or the defendant, and thus were usually settled. 1
b. Seizure

Instruments for catching game, such as snares, nets, dogs, and guns
were subject to seizure under the Game Laws.2 1 1 It is here that we come

to the conflict between the Game Laws and the right (if there were such
a right) to keep and bear arms. The details of that conflict will be
discussed below.

219

Authorities could, and did, seize guns.220 A warrant

was required for the search and seizure of guns.221 To circumvent the
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 77.
See id. at 76.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 76, 78, 90.
Id. at 89-90.
Id at 90, 92.
Id. at 78-79.
See infra Part IV.C.3.

220.

MUNSCHE, supranote 35, at 79-80.

221.

Id. at 80-81.
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process of obtaining a specific warrant, some counties issued general
warrants.2 22 These warrants provided "for the seizure of any gun, dog,
net or 'engine' kept by an unqualified person." 223
Professor Munsche doubts the effectiveness of these attempts to
disarm the English. 2 24 The prevalence of news articles involving
shooting and the openness of gun possession by the unqualified argues
against wholesale disarmament.2 2 5 Dogs, however, as instruments of
hunting, were subject to seizure and destruction, ordered by the gentry
and the nobles. 226 The steward of the Duke of Devonshire gave notice to
the Duke's tenants "if any of them keep any Dogs that destroy game,
unless they dispose of them immediately, I have ordered the
Keeper .. . to shoot them."22 ' This summary of the seizure and killing of
dogs illuminates the difference between eighteenth century England and
American society today. Imagine what would happen today if hunting
dogs were taken and shot?
c. Impressment

Another enforcement mechanism was the impressment of poachers
into the Navy. 228 Impressments were not a formal punishment until

1800, but some poachers were singled out. 2 29 Professor Munsche
concludes that it was difficult to say how many poachers were pressed,
One poet wrote:
but it did happen.
For his Majesty's Service, we'll press
The Felon who steals but a Hare;
For his Brats, the whole Parish assess:
23
All poachers and Anglers, beware. 1

The story of the Game Laws up to the time of the adoption of our
Bill of Rights is an interesting one. But, one could ask what is its
relevance to the English legacy of the Second Amendment? The
difference between that society and ours is stark. I've done an informal
poll of people familiar with rural areas asking them what would happen
222. Id. at 81.
223. Id. Yorkshire, for example, had a county gamekeeper who was authorized to seize guns
from the unqualified. Id.

224. Id.
225. Id
226. Id. at 82.
227.

Id (citing JOAN WAKE, THE BRUDENELLS OF DEENE 218-19 (1953)).

228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
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if hunting rifles and dogs were taken away and hunting outlawed. Their
universal answer is that the enforcers would be shot.
3. The Game Laws and the English Bill of Rights
The Game Laws were not mentioned explicitly in the Bill of Rights,
but these laws did conflict-if one assumes an individual right to bear
arms had been created-with the Bill of Rights. The purpose of the
militia and the Game Laws were in conflict. Professor Munsche writes:
The purpose of [the formation of a militia] was to make the
establishment of a "standing army" unnecessary, and thus prevent the
Crown from acquiring the means to govern without Parliament. In
practice, the militia failed to supplant the regular army, but the
conviction persisted in many quarters that English liberty was
dependent on the existence of an armed and vigilant yeomanry. This
obviously ran counter to the spirit of the game act.232
Professor Malcolm states: "If the Game Act was still in force despite the
Declaration of Rights," the "have arms" provision would be a right that
"merely . . . [protected] the wealthy." 233 We have seen that Professor
Malcolm deals with this problem by stating that the Bill of Rights
created the right to bear arms, with the conflict with the Game Laws to
be dealt with later.234 Parliament did not resolve the conflict. Was
parliamentary action necessary? Patrick Charles disagrees once again
with Malcolm's interpretation. "[T]here is nothing in the drafting history
of the Declaration of Rights that extended the right to 'have arms' to
hunting or game. None of the grievances or debates even mentioned it in
passing." 235 We should start with the Game Law of 1671, which
authorized the following:
[O]ne or more Game-keeper or Game-keepers within their respective
Mannours or Royalties, who being thereunto soe authorized may take
and seize all such Gunns, Bowes, Grayhounds, Setting-dogs, Lurchers
or other Dogs to kill Hares or Conies, Ferretts, Tramells, Lowbells,
Hayes or other Netts, Harepipes, Snares or other Engines for the
takeing and killing of Conyes, Hares, Pheasants Partridges or other
Game as within the precincts of such respective Mannours shall be

232. Id. at 79.
233. MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 120.
234. Id. at 121-22. Charles here comments, "Malcolm is showing her twentieth-century bias.
The Declaration of Rights' 'have arms' provision and the Game Acts were in fact adopted to protect
the interests of the wealthy. The 1690's Parliamentarians were primarily concerned with the landed
gentry's interests." Charles, supra note 88, at 386.
235. Charles, supra note 88, at 386.
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used by any person or persons, who by this Act are prohibited to keepe
or use the same.2 3 6

The 1692 Act omitted any explicit reference to guns, but did ban
any other Instruments for the destruction of Fish Fowle or other
Game.' . . . One may argue that 'guns' could be grouped in with the
1692 Act's mention of "other Instruments." 237 In 1693, there was a
proposal that would have resolved any conflict between any right to
arms and the game acts by allowing "every Protestant to keep a musket
in his House for his defence." 23 The proposal also would have made it
clear that there was an individual right to keep arms."' It did not pass.24 0
One of its opponents protested that it would "arm the mob."241
Similar to the 1692 Act, guns were also omitted from the 1706
Act.24 2 Professor Munsche states that the law was unclear.24 3 Guns could
"be seized by the lord of the manor, but subsequent statutes did not say
whether an unqualified person could be prosecuted simply for having a
flintlock or a pistol in his possession." 244 Did the omission of "guns"
mean that possession of them was permitted, or were guns included in

the term "engines"? Professor Malcolm argues that "guns" were not
covered at all by the new Act.245 She assumes that "engines" did not
include guns and explains any conflicting evidence as confusion.24 6 She
supports this assertion by pointing out that the conservatives who
controlled Parliament were willing to concede to the right to have
weapons and to do away with the prohibition against firearms from the
new act.-

"Although subsequent legislation brought statute law into

conformity with the right to have arms enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
there was still confusion in the counties. "248 Some seizure of guns and
prosecution did take place.249

236. Charles II. 1670 & 1671: An Act for the Better Preservation of the Game, and for
Secuing 1I;rrens Not Inclosed and the Severali Fishings of this Realme, BRITISH HISTORY
ONLINE. http:/ www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp745-746 (last visited Feb. 15,

2018).
237.

Charles, supra note 88. at 393 (referencing 4 W. &. M., c. 23 (1692) (Eng.)).

238.

Id. at 403.

239.
240.

See id.
Id.

241.

Id.

242.
243.

MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 128.
MUNSClIE, supra note 35, at 79.

244.

Id.

245.

See MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 128.

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 128-29.
See id. at 128.
Id. at 127.
Id.
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Professor Malcolm does state that "[i]t was during the eighteenth
century . . . that Englishmen came to accept the Whig view of the utility
of an armed citizenry." 250 She cites two cases (decided in 173925 and
1752252) that held it was not illegal to possess a gun per se for the
proposition that there came "repeated pronouncements of the right for
Protestant subjects of all ranks to have firearms." 2 3 Charles's analysis of
these cases is that they only banned guns if used for hunting game, but
did not rule that there was any individual right to have a gun. "At no
time did it stipulate that having arms was a right." 254 My earlier point
about the lack of controversy and debate about any conflict between
the Game Laws and the Declaration bears repeating. The negative
evidence tells us that supposed conflict did not exist in the minds of
Englishmen. It took till 1739-fifty years after the Declaration-to get a
definitive ruling on whether or not the Game Laws banned gun
possession per se.255
4. The Game Laws-Conclusion
The Post-Restoration Game Laws lasted from the Game Act of
1671 to the Game Reform Act of 1831.256 The purpose of these laws was
to enhance and preserve the status of country gentlemen and maintain
their superiority to the moneyed interests.2 57 "Their message was that
land was superior to money."22 As such, these acts were more than sport
regulation, they were social legislation-to preserve and protect a way
of life. To allow the lower classes to hunt would take from the yeoman
"respectful submission and manly dependence." 2 59 If game were
saleable, it was thought by the gentry that country gentlemen would be
degraded into "men who were not mindful of 'gentlemanlike and liberal
feelings' but interested only in 'paultry profit."' 2 "0 The Game Reform
Act of 1831, which radically changed the Game Laws, then, represented
not just a change in the law, but a change in society.2 61 "In a world

250. Id. at 128.
251. Rex v. Gardner (1739) 93 Eng. Rep. 1056 (K.B.).
252. Wingfield v. Stratford and Osman (1752) 96 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B.).
253.

MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 128-29.

254. Charles, supra note 88, at 397; see Wingfield, 96 Eng. Rep. at 787.
255.
256.

See MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 129.
MUNSCHE, supra note 35, at 8, 156, 167-68.

257.
258.
259.

See id at 164.
Id.
Id. at 165.

260. Id. at 166 (quoting 5 THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1803 TO THE
PRESENT TIME, at col. 41 (T.C. Hansard ed., 1812)).

261.

Id. at 166-68.
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where everything had its price, there was little room for tradition,
loyalty, or deference." 2 6 2
It is hard, if not impossible, to figure out exactly how the Game
Laws affected any right to keep and bear arms, but one thing is clearone could not use a gun (or a dog) to hunt game. Heller states that there
is a right to hunt in the Second Amendment, 26 3 but there is no basis for
that right in English history. Looking at the social purpose of the Game
Laws, we realize that the basic flaw with studying "The English Legacy"
in order to interpret the Second Amendment is that English society from
the Declaration to 1792 (the date of the Second Amendment) was a
totally different social system than ours, then or now. Focusing on
particular individual aspects of English laws, such as the Declaration or
the amendment of the Game Act just misses the point. It is trying to
figure out how
one system works by studying another
system. A jet engine works the same way as steam engine on a high
level of abstraction-but they are different systems. "The English
Legacy" is useless as an interpretative tool for the meaning of the
Second Amendment.
D.

The English Militia

Since the Second Amendment begins with an assertion of the
necessity of a well-regulated militia,264 a study of the English militia
should inform the Amendment's meaning, but it does not. After
reviewing the hapless history of the English militia, it is hard to see how
a militia is necessary for the security of a free state. In England and
America, diligent practice and drill were essential for the infantryman to
execute orders effectively.2 5 A militia could not stand up to a regular
army. 266 The English militia in the period from the Glorious Revolution
until 1792 (and after) was bound up with the Whig Supremacy. 26 7 The
officers had to meet a landed property qualification and formed part of
the local magistracy that was a central component to the Whig

262.
263.
264.

Id at 168.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
Id. at 592-95.

265.

William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History,

136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1992).
266. See id at 37.
267. See id at 17 & n.54.
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dominance.268 Unlike the army, the militia was not subject to the king.269
It was never a universal militia, nor was it a substitute for the army. 2 70
The militia of the eighteenth century represents two related military
tendencies: it was an attempt both to create a reserve formation for
home defence and to use an obligation of military service on the
citizen the basis for recruiting. Political factors made it impossible to
introduce true conscription and necessary to keep the militia distinct
from the army, which led to various inconveniences.

. .

. It may fairly

be claimed that the militia was an expedient proportioned to the extent
of the danger to be met. It is not true that the danger was imaginary
and the militia superfluous; at the same time there were good reasons
for avoiding revolutionary measures like full conscription. 271
As in the prior sections, there will be a counterpoint between
history as told by Professor Malcolm and Heller on one hand, and
historical sources on the other. Malcolm and Heller both speak of a
universal militia, but there never was an actual universal militia in
England, nor did the dominant governing establishment want one.
Justice Scalia in Heller states:
Besides ignoring the historical reality that the Second Amendment was
not intended to lay down a "novel principl[e]" but rather codified a
right "inherited from our English ancestors," petitioners' interpretation
does not even achieve the narrower purpose that prompted codification
of the right. If, as they believe, the Second Amendment right is no
more than the right to keep and use weapons as a member of an
organized militia, the organized militia is the sole institutional
beneficiary of the Second Amendment's guarantee-it does not assure
the existence of a "citizens' militia" as a safeguard against tyranny. For
Congress retains plenary authority to organize the militia, which must
include the authority to say who will belong to the organized
force. ... Thus, if petitioners are correct, the Second Amendment
protects citizens' right to use a gun in an organization from which
Congress has plenary authority to exclude them. It guarantees a select
militia of the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not the people's
militia that was the concern of the founding generation. 272

268. J R WESTERN, THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE STORY OF A
POLITICAL ISSUE 304 (1965).

269.
270.
271.
272.
(footnote

Id. at 436.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 443-44.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599-600 (2008) (first alteration in original)
omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)).
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"

Professor Western directly contradicts the idea of a universal militia
in England: "The Shelburne plan [a plan to arm to general populace] was
attacked in the commons as putting anns into the hands of people not fit
to be trusted with them." 273 This statement also contradicts any idea that
the militia could be used for a legitimate revolution.
Not only did the upper classes not want the general population
armed, the lower class's hostility to serving would have prevented any
universal militia. The riots of 1757 and 1796 were the most extreme
reaction to militia call-ups for militia service.2 74 Mobs ensued in every
region, threatening officials to prevent them from enforcing a new
militia act.275 The new system of recruitment of 1757 was viewed as an
"upper-class plot." 2 7 6 The Militia was not drawn from all of the British
population.277 Scotland was considered too poor to have a militia and, as
was stated in Parliament, "the people of Scotland were 'tinctured with
the notion of despotism' and might, if aimed, be 'fit instruments in the
hands of a treacherous, tyrannic and unprincipled administration.' 2
There was a proposal in 1775 to create a Scottish militia, to allow
the militia to serve abroad, and to augment its ranks, in response to the
beginnings of the American Revolution and the growth of radicalism,
but nothing came of it. 2 7 9 The English Militia devotes fourteen pages
analyzing the complex political alignments of the time; all proposals for
changes in the militia were defeated.o
The gun rights literature speaks glowingly of the militia as a
community organization whose members enthusiastically trained as a
military force.2 8' On the contrary, the reaction of those liable to the
called up reminds one of the attitudes towards the draft in the Vietnam
War. The call-ups yield at best was not great, and it was constantly
threatening to fall short of the statutory target.

273.

WESTERN, supra note 268, at 217.

274.
275.
276.
277.

See id. at 290-302.
See id. at 290-91.
Id at 299.
Id. at 209, 258-59.

278. Id. at 209 (quoting 8 WILLIAM COBBETT, COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF
ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST IN 1066 TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1236-37 (1813)).

279.
280.

Id. at 206-08.
Id. at 205-19.

281. Regiments were often stationed away from home because being in the home county was
bad for discipline and it was feared that in case of riot, the militias would not fire on their neighbors.

Id. at 401-02.
282. See id at 283. In the Borough subdivision of Surrey only 300 out of 1000 appeared. Id
Many candidates were exempt from call up. See id. at 249. One statistic is from Sussex in 1803,
"there were 9630 men of the right age who were exempt and 14,102 who remained liable." Id.
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The militia draft was always limited-there was never a universal
arming of the people. Recruits were chosen by lot; and, if chosen, one
could buy himself out by paying a fine of f 10 or finding a substitute. 8
One could even buy militia insurance, which would indemnify those
who were "unlucky in the ballot." 28 4 In 1762, insurance against being
called up was forbidden, except where confined to one parish.2 " This
law was repealed in 1786, after which commercial insurance was again
available.286 From 1762 on, public funds gave poor men f5 to find
substitutes or pay the fine.287
[P]opular hostility to military service was not got rid of. Attempts to
move towards it were felt as a grievance and were apt unseasonably to
remind the people that they had other grievances as well. The arming
of the manhood of the nation at large by a regime which was fairly
liberal and yet not democratic was bound to be a delicate operation.
The aversion of the people to being armed gave their rulers a salutary
early warning of this, and only under extreme pressure from Napoleon
did they make a half-hearted attempt. Thus for political no less for
economic and administrative reasons it was not possible to advance to
a true system of national military training from the quaint simulacrum
of it that was the militia.2 8 8
Once called, the militia was chronically insubordinate-"[o]fficers
seem to have felt themselves to be on the edge of a volcano." 289 Officers,
not surprisingly were in short supply. Officers were to be men of
property: "The authors of the earlier militia acts had intended that the
militia should be commanded by men of property, and that as far as
possible all men of property should take their turn," but few men of
property could neglect their private affairs for long and either resigned
or did not serve. 290 Thus, there was "a pennanent shortage of
officers." 29 ' "[A] natural source of supply was to be found in the sons of
noblemen and wealthy gentlemen, who had neither to care for an estate
nor earn a living."2 9 2 But "[y]oung men of the better class often proved
unfit for responsible posts. They were commonly unused to hard work
and to the complicated financial dealings which even the command of a
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 251.
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 253-54.

288.

Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).

289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 419.
Id. at 304.
Id at 306.
Id at 309.
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company then entailed."2 93 The militia resembled the Church of England
in providing employment for the sons of the oligarchy.2 94 As such, the
militia's martial fervor was similar to the religious fever of the Anglican
Church of that time. 29 5
The officers were the achilles heel of the militia. The men were
satisfactory material, and in wartime at least they were not too
badly trained. But they were so badly led that it is doubtful if they
could have faced seasoned troops with any hope of success. . . . [T]he
bulk of the offices were likely to be raw or disreputable or too old
or absent .... 296
The militia's main virtue was that it was cheap; but even so it was
underfunded. 29 7 The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century is replete
with instances of undersupply. 29 8 Arms wore out before their scheduled
replacement, and the replacements were tardy. 299 Ammunition became
unusable.3 00 The quality of arms was such that they were frequently
unable to fire.30 ' Militia members were given supplies, such as clothing,
and were at least supposed to be paid, but all too frequently supplies
were short and material, including arms and ammunition, wore out and
were not replaced.3 0 2
The militia did have a social and political function. The militia
guarded prisoners of war, chased smugglers, watched against possible
invasions (which never took place), and suppressed riots.303 The militia,
however, itself caused riots when lists were promulgated of men liable
for militia duty.304 Far from being a community force, militias were
stationed outside their own counties "so that they would never be called
on to fight their friends and relations."30 5 it provided positions for the
wealthier landed gentry who comprised a substantial portion of the
officer class.306 It fit in with the period of Whig Ascendancy; the Whigs
wanting political power in their hands, and not in the King's.30 7 Since
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 311.
See id at 309.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 339 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 345.
See id at 342.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 343 & n.7.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 343-57.
Id. at 429-34.
See id. at 290-302.
See id. at 433.
See id. at 304, 309.
See MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 112, 116.
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the King commanded the regular Army, the militia served as a
counterweight and provided the high-landed gentry with power, position,
and patronage.3 08 Thus the Militia Acts were similar to Game Laws,
which limited hunting to the higher gentry and the ability to vote which
the required landed wealth.
In conclusion, the English Militia vacillated between two extremes.
At one extreme, it would have abolished the national forces:
The national government would have ceased to control the armed
forces of the state: neither the king nor any other central authority
would have had the means to enforce obedience to their commands in
the county. It is not surprising that Charles II vetoed the militia bill of
1678, modest though it was. 309
The opposite extreme was that the militia would be adjunct of the
regular army, being in the same position as our National Guard for the
Armed Forces. The resistance to any general call-up and the desire of the
local oligarchs prevented this from happening.3 10 But "popular hostility
to military service was not got rid of. . . . The aversion of the people to
bring armed" prevented "a true system of national military training from
the quaint simulacrum of it that was the militia."" The militia burdened
the poorer subjects by their being liable to call-ups and paying taxes to
support it.312 Since someone called up could buy his way out or pay a
substitute, the militia draft was actually a randomly imposed tax. The
militia riots were the most compelling symptom of their resentment.
Professor Western describes the fundamental economic and social
change that made the militia obsolete:
There was a deeper reason why the quarrels over the militia died
down-the palpable obsolescence of the backward-looking radical
ideals which had inspired the militia's revival. Rapid social change
made it hard for even the most resolute backwoodsman to go on taking
them seriously. As opponents of the militia agitation had never tired of
pointing out, the ideal of a citizen army, with men of property filling
the ranks, had been made incapable of realisation by the development
308.

See WESTERN, supra note 268, at 436.
309. Id. One extreme lives on today in the "insurrectionist" interpretation of the Second
Amendment-the hope that an armed populace will "take back their government." Heller gives this
as one of the militia's functions: "[W]hen the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and
organized, they are better able to resist tyranny." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598
(2008). The insurrectionists ignore the provision in the Constitution that makes the President
Commander-in-Chief of the militia, Article II, Section 2. See generally Carl Bogus, Heller and
Insurrectionism,59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 253 (2008).
310. See WESTERN, supra note 268, at 444.

311.
312.

Id. at 302.
See id at 22 & n.3.
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of a capitalist economy. The middle class of businessmen and farmersfor-profit needed to devote their entire attention to business and could
not take time off for fighting. That was possible only in a community
of poor subsistence-farmers. The upper class, likewise, no longer
regarded war as its profession, and was not eager to sacrifice time and
money to military pursuits. Even the skilled artisan could not be spared
from his trade (he might forget it). Save for privileged body of
sportsmen, the people had ceased to have arms. 3 1 3

V.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the English society of the eighteenth century
differed too much from the American society of that era to serve as an
interpretive guide to the Second Amendment. This poses the questionwhere does Heller go wrong? Of course, Heller is not alone in
misunderstanding legal history: "constitutional discourse is replete with
historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at worst,
howlers." 314 Heller starts with many assumptions that are wrong. First, it
starts with the assumption that our Bill of Rights simply embodies
English rights."' This is obviously not so, as seen in the First, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments. Article I limits the powers of Congress; in England,
Parliament's power was unlimited. There were no rights in England
that were immune from Parliamentary legislation and the right to
keep arms in the English Bill of Rights was expressly subject to
parliamentary action.
Another problem is that Professor Malcolm and Justice Scalia
assume England was in a constant armed state in the eighteenth century.
This leaves Professor Malcolm with the problem of explaining the
diminution of gun rights in the following years. Professor Western,
however, states that although England was beset with armed violence
from the Puritan Revolution to the reign of William III, internal armed
conflict disappeared during the following century."'
The militia established under the Restoration Acts belonged to a world
of bitter political and religious animosities, where any party quarrel
was an incipient civil war and those in power always tried-though not
always very systematically-to suppress their opponents by force. The
decline of the old militia was a sign that things were changing. Men

3 13.
314.

Id. at 440 (footnote omitted).
Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,95 COLUM. L.

REV. 523, 525 (1995).
315. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582-83 (2008).
316.
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were not only ceasing to possess weapons but also trying more and
more to live amicably with those with whom they differed in politics
or religion.3 1 7

The assumption that our Bill of Rights just copies English rights
stems from an assumption that English society was the same as ours, one
made by Professor Malcolm certainly makes this assumption."' The
subtitle of her book, "The Origins of an Anglo-American Right,"
conflates two societies. The most illuminating passage in her book is
where she points out the "inequitable" attitude of the British upper class
in keeping hunting for themselves and then proceeds to psychoanalyze
that attitude: "Justification for such a blatantly inequitable standard
involved a carefully nurtured double standard . . . . [I]n 1671, in the
guise of an act to protect wildlife, Parliament passed the first law in
English history that took from the majority of Englishmen the privilege
of having firearms.""'
Her views assume that there is an underlying right to bear arms for
the majority and that any legislation to the contrary is fundamentally
wrong. This, however, is projecting on historical England the views of
the NRA onto the views of the Whig oligarchs. There were no such
views as shown by the Declaration's limitations, Blackstone, the Game

Laws, and the rejection of any sort of universal militia. The elite were
sure they owed their position to God and it was their duty to rule
England, from the nation as a whole to their county.3 20 Today, their
sense of their position is exemplified by the aristocrats of Downton
Abbey', who are merely a remnant of a once all-powerful elite. None of
the show's characters evidence any ambivalence about their position.
Another fundamental

error is trying to understand

eighteenth

century English society by taking a few quotes from here and a few facts
from there. It was a system and has to be understood as a whole. I can
use an example from a talk I had with my auto mechanic. I was asking
him about the problems of repairing modem cars. He said that today's
cars are better built, but that the problem now is with customers who try

to find solutions to their car problems on the Internet. Because they have
no idea how a car works as a whole, they think they know the answer,
but do not. An example would be a customer who is sure that the
radiator thermostat is the problem, but does not see that
something else is causing the thermostat problem. Systems, whether

317.

Id at 441.

318.

MALCOLM, supra note 100, at 135.

319.

Id. at 12.

320.

Id. at 12-13.
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cars or societies, have to be understood as a whole. As Professor
Flaherty emphasizes:
More importantly, the legal community notoriously ignores the
principle that the individual historical questions that its members seek
to answer cannot be understood except as "part[] of a larger
historical . . . whole." . . . Another

procedural

corollary

requires

viewing, or at least attempting to view, events, ideas, and controversies
in a larger context. Here legal scholars, in what in its worst form is
dubbed "law office history," notoriously pick and choose facts and
incidents ripped out of context that serve their purposes. 321
Professor Ellen Katz, in an article describing how the Roberts Court
uses precedent gives a description that also applies to Heller:
It leaves precedent denatured and relegated to a kind of cameo
appearance in a willful construction of decisional history. As such, this
use of precedent is not unlike the abuse of legislative history, wherein
the record of the past becomes little more than a narrative filled with
data points that are mined for supporting arguments. The weight given
to a particular statement or textual provision becomes purely a matter
of perspective and desired outcome, as holdings become contingent
explanations and dicta is transformed into binding rules. 322
Professor Mark Tushnent argues that historical interpretivism is
internally flawed:
The first step is an argument that interpretivism must rest on an
account of historical knowledge more subtle than the naive
presumption that past attitudes and intentions are directly accessible to
present understanding. The second step identifies the most plausible
such account, the view - sometimes called hermeneutics - that
historical understanding requires an imaginative transposition of
former world views into the categories of our own. The third step is an
argument that such an imaginative transposition implies an ambiguity
that is inconsistent with the project of liberal constitutional theory (and
interpretivism). The project of imaginative transposition can be carried
through in a number of different ways, with a number of different
results, none of which is more "correct" than the others. 323

321.

Flaherty, supra note 314, at 553-54 (first two alterations in original) (quoting H. Jefferson

Powell, Rules for Originalists,73 VA. L. REV. 659, 674 (1987)).
Ellen Katz, Hobby Lobby and the Pathology of Citizens United, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L.

&

322.

PUB. POL'Y, 2014, at 29.
323. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983).
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Heller performed the second step of imaginative transposition, but
the imagination stemmed from the Hollywood West of "stand your
ground," rather than the Georgian Age. Heller just does not work as an
exercise in historical interpretation, but instead functions as an example
of how not to apply history to the Constitution.
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